Range voting with mixtures of honest and strategic voters (Executive Summary)
It was conjectured by Range-doubters that
while it works well with 100% honest voters,
and also well with 100% strategic voters, might not work so well
with a mixture of the two. The problem would be
if (say) more Bush voters than Gore voters were strategic, leading
to a huge advantage for Bush.
In contrast (the doubters continue) other voting methods such as IRV or Condorcet ought
to be better in that respect.
While that sounds like a severe and obvious problem, computer simulations reveal that
in fact, this problem does not raise Range's Bayesian Regret
enough to kick it out of first place. Range is still superior to IRV and Condorcet
methods, according to the Bayesian Regret yardstick, even under simulation conditions
specifically designed to exhibit this effect in a severe way.