A proof that range voting satisfies certain criteria that no ranked-ballot voting method can satisfy

For a formal scientific paper that does the same stuff as this web page, see paper #98 here.
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We begin with some proofs that (essentially) range voting satisfies both AFB ("avoids favorite betrayal") and ICC ("immune to candidate cloning") but that no voting method based on rank-order ballots can satisfy both. Later we give a long list of theorems, each of which exhibits an interesting set of criteria which no voting method based on rank-order ballots can satisfy – but in each case, range voting satisfies them all. In some of these theorems (which we shall note), rank-equalities are permitted in the rank-order ballots.

Warren D. Smith's proof that (for pure rank ballots) ICC & AFB incompatible (essentially):

These four criteria, for a voting system which inputs pure-rank-order-ballots and
outputs the name of a winner (or a set of co-equal winners to be chosen among by random
tiebreak), are incompatible:
a1. AFB = avoids favorite betrayal
a2. ICC = immune to candidate cloning
a3. no vetoer = There does not exist a voter who can single-handedly prevent a candidate
    of her choice from winning, regardless of how the other voters vote.
a4. neutrality = symmetry under candidate renaming = permuting the candidate names 
   on the ballot rankings permutes their winning probabilities in the same way.

Equivalent Theorem:
These six criteria, for a single-winner voting system based on
pure-rank-order-ballots, are incompatible:
a1. AFB = avoids favorite betrayal
a2. ICC = immune to candidate cloning
a3. reduces to simple majority vote in 2-candidate case.
   As we shall discuss below, due to Campbell-Kelly 2003 this criterion can be replaced by
   the demand that a "vetoer" does not exist (i.e. no voter exists, who can singlehandedly
   prevent any candidate X he chooses from winning, regardless of all the other votes)
   and the demand that the system be deterministic (chance is not employed except where 
   required by symmetry, i.e in the case of true ties; or, better, we can regard any system
   obeying a5 as being 100% deterministic but simply outputting tied-winner sets; this 
   interpretation is also ok), and the demand it be based on rank-order ballots.  
   And this replacement is desirable since you get a stronger theorem.
   But leaving a3 as is, is convenient for the purposes of the proof below.
a4. neutrality = symmetry under candidate renaming = permuting the candidate names 
   on the ballot rankings permutes their winning probabilities in the same way
a5. method is deterministic aside from tiebreaks which (if any) are random 
    [this axiom can be subsumed into the definition of "voting system".  
     It is simplest, but is not actually necessary, for the tiebreaking to give
     equally likely win probabilities to all co-winners; it actually will suffice
     for us if the probabilities are fixed and positive for each co-winner in each scenario.]
a6. adding a new candidate to the election whom all voters unanimously rank unique-bottom, 
does not change the winner.
    Actually, a6 can be dropped too if we are using Campbell-Kelly 2003 to replace a3 
with "no vetoer."  That is because we shall only use a6 in a 3-candidate situation with an
odd number of voters where removal of the always-ranked-last candidate yields 2-candidate
simple majority vote; and those situations were already covered by the CK 2003 theorem.

Notes about criterion 3 (simple majority rule in 2-candidate case):
   Actually, this is a consequence of determinism, neutrality,
   anonymity and positive responsiveness [voting for A top breaks an A-containing perfect 
   tie in favor of A, plus monotonicity] and hence really is NOT NEEDED per se 
   [thanks to Forest Simmons for pointing that out]
May's theorem on 2-candidate elections:
A group decision function meets 1, 2, and 3 below
if and only if it is the simple majority method:
    1* It is symmetric under permuting the voters. (anonymity)
    2* Reversing each preference reverses the group preference. (neutrality)
    3* If the group decision was 0 or 1 and a voter raises a vote from -1 to 0 or 1 
       or from 0 to 1, then the group decision is 1. (positive responsiveness)
[Kenneth O. May: A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple 
majority decision,  Econometrica 20,4 (1952) 680-684.
Mark Fey: May's theorem with an infinite population, 
Social Choice and Welfare 23,2 (2004) 275-293.
T.N.Tideman: A majority-rule characterization with multiple extensions,
Social Choice & Welfare 3 (1986) 12-30.]
  Also, even better, simple majority rule in 2-candidate case
  is a consequence of AFB (actually strategyproofness, but this is the same as AFB in 
  the 2-candidate rank-equality-forbidden case with odd#voters, and "odd" is the only parity
   we shall need) and non-dictatorship (which is implied by the nonexistence of a vetoer)
   and determinism:
[Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S.Kelly: 
A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule,
Economic Theory 22 (2003) 557-568]
   Both the May and Campbell-Kelly results above have versions that work even if equal rankings 
are allowed in ballots, incidentally.
   Also, majority-rule is a consequence of Neutrality, Anonymity, Pareto criterion (if all voters 
   say A>B then B cannot win), odd number of voters,
   and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
[E.S.Maskin: Majority rule, social welfare functions, and game forms. In: K.Basu,
P.K.Pattanaik, K.Suzumura (eds.) Choice, welfare, and development. Oxford Clarendon Press 1995]
   a result which was improved by
[D.E. Campbell & J.S. Kelly: A simple characterization of majority rule, 
Economic Theory 15,3 (2000) 689-700].
   Two more characterizations, both of which strike me as somewhat silly, are
[G.Asan & M.R.Sanver: 
Another characterization of the majority rule, 
Economics Letters 75,3 (2002) 409-413.]
[G.J.Woeginger: A new characterization of the majority rule, Economics Letters 81,1 (2003) 89-94.]
In particular, the Asan-Sanver result actually seems a trivial corollary of the far stronger 
Smith+Young theorem we'll mention later which was proved over 20 years previously. A&S say
  Neutrality, Anonymity, Pareto (if all voters say A>B or A=B with at least some saying A>B, 
  then B cannot win), and a partition-consistency property (if both subdistricts say A wins or ties
  with at least one saying A wins, then A wins in the combined country).

More careful definitions of criteria 1 & 2:
Clone immunity for the purposes of this proof (and it also is
I think common usage) is this.
  If clones of C are added to the election, that does not affect the
winner (except perhaps up to replacement of the winner by a clone).
Here "clones" have to be contiguous in all rank-orders (for rank-order
voting systems). There can be slight preferences among the clones
e.g. some voter prefers C4>C1>C2>C3
but these preferences are assumed to have FAR SMALLER strength than
C versus a non-clone of C, e.g. far smaller strength than any
comparisons like D>C or C>G or (for that matter) A>B.
Therefore range voters will always vote clones almost-equal, to within
ε, say, where we will allow ourselves to take the limit ε→0.
  That is the definition used in Tideman's book, and he invented
the whole clone-immunity concept.
  Under this definition range voting is clone-immune, and
so is Schulze-beatpath voting, and so is IRV, but plurality
and Copeland and approval voting are not clone-immune
(and Tideman's book agrees with all these statements).
[Mike Ossipoff with elegant wording:
"A clone-set is a set of candidates between whom no one has voted any
other candidate(s)."]

(Weak) Favorite betrayal:
AFB is the criterion that it is never strategically forced
for any voter to rank his true favorite, strictly below topmost.
(A "strategically forced" move means, if you don't make that move,
the election result comes out worse, in terms of expected utility,
from your point of view.)
  Really this all depends on the candidate-utility numbers for that
voter, which is something I (badly) did not fully explain in the proof below.
To fill in the gaps, one should point out at various places how to construct utility
numbers to make it clear that voter-betrayal decisions were indeed
strategically forced, otherwise the utility would be worse.  But dreaming up appropriate
utility numbers for the voter in question, is usually a triviality.

Notes about the strategy the proof shall use: 
The proof will work by demonstrating that, if a single-winner voting system based on
pure-rank-order-ballots satisfying axioms 1-6 did exist, then we could deduce a logical

If any of these properties 1-6 are violated in any election situation, 
then they are violated by that voting system, period; and we are done.

In the proof, a lot of little election situations will be considered,
and if in any one of those situations, there is an ICC violation
or an AFB violation (with some utility values and some way to alter
some vote to betray), then game over and proof done.

We are allowed to use the assumption there is no useful
way to betray a favorite, or use the assumption ICC is true, or any other axiom,
to create new election situations and to deduce the winners in those
new situations.  (If those deductions were wrong, the proof
would be complete because a contradiction would have been found.)
Then in these new situations, we can aim to complete the proof by
finding some other contradiction.

Incidentally, if we alter election 1 to get election 2 and
make deductions about elections 1 and 2 using made-up utility values
and reasoning about favorite-betrayal, then 
it is not necessary that the utility values in
the two elections be consistent.  That is because the voting system
acts based solely on the votes and works in ignorance of honest utility values.

Proof of the Equivalent Theorem:
(We've already discussed why, by results of previous authors, the two theorems are equivalent.)
The proof will work by demonstrating that, if a single-winner voting system based on
pure-rank-order-ballots satisfying axioms 1-6 did exist, then we could deduce a logical
contradiction.  So suppose such a system existed.
Consider these 3 votes:
By symmetry axiom 4 this is a perfect 3-way tie with win probabilities 1/3, 1/3, 1/3.
However we shall argue under axioms 1-3 that A must win, which is a
contradiction that establishes the proof.
[Really, we shall go through all the 7 possible winners ABC-tie, BC, AC, AB, and A, B, C 
proving none of these 7 possibiities are allowed by our axioms, which is the sought
contradiction.  However, we focus on the two cases ABC and A because they
remain after the other 5 cases are eliminated, and then we can prove "both are true"
which is the requisite contradiction that establishes the proof.]  So:
If A does not win, then B or C does (or some sort of tie; we'll consider the cases below).

If B wins (or if AB tie), then the C>A>B voter would betray C to vote A>C>B getting
and then {B,C} is a clone set and hence by axioms 2 and 3 then A must win
and hence the betrayal worked and hence we get a contradiction with axiom 1.
(In slo-mo that is: the votes are really A>BC, A>BC, BC>A in a 2-candidate election,
which A wins by axiom 3, and when we clone BC into two candidates B and C,
A still must win by axiom 2.)
This betrayal would be a utility improvement from the point of view of that
voter if her vote really is "C>A>>B", i.e. if her utility for B is
greater than her average utility for {A,B,C}.
To see that this betrayal was strategically forced, we also have to
note that the alternate dishonest vote (which is not a C-betrayal) C>B>A,
would not work since B still would win [here's how we know that:
now {B,C} is a clone set, so by axioms 2 and 3 we know B or C must win;
but winner here must be B and not C (and not BC tie) because if it were C 
or BC tie then the A>B>>C-voter could betray: B>C>A causing 
in which case B must win by axiom 6.]

If C wins, or if BC tie, or if ABC tie, or if AC tie,
then the A>B>C-voter (whom for this purpose we assume feels A>B>>C)
can betray A to vote B>A>C getting
whereupon {A,C} is a clone set and hence by axioms 2 and 3 then B must win
and hence the betrayal worked (assuming this voter had utilities such that
B was valued above the mean utility of A,B,C)
and hence we get a contradiction with axiom 1.
[The alternate dishonest vote which is not an A-betrayal, A>C>B, would not work since
C still would win when
because {A,C} is a winning clone set
and if A wins (or AC tie) then B>C>>A voter betrays: C>A>B to 
make C win
by axiom 6.]

Remark 1.
This theorem is not claiming the 6 criteria are good or bad (although they happen to
all sound pretty good to me), and not claiming anybody necessarily should accept or 
reject them.  It simply is claiming that it is logically unachievable to satisfy all of
them at once by a rank-order voting system.
But (normalized) range voting does satisfy all of them at once.
[It is very nice when you can prove every voting system cannot do
something - even voting systems nobody has ever invented yet.]

Remark 2.
Antiplurality voting obeys all 6 axioms except for #2 (and #6).
You can make a version of antiplurality voting that obeys #6 by
making a last-place-vote count -1, a second-last-vote count -ε,
a third-last-vote count -ε², etc in the limit ε→0+,
highest score wins.

I think there are also an infinite number of
other rank-ballot systems avoiding favorite-betrayal,
e.g. weighted positional systems depending on the
last C-2 rankings only, where C is the number of candidates.

Approval Voting obeys  all 6 axioms except for #2 (provided we are sufficiently generous
about axioms 3 and 6; there is no doubt these are satisfied "in practice").

Remark 3.
Schulze beatpaths voting obeys all 6 axioms except for #1.
So does Instant Runoff Voting (at least if we are sufficiently generous about the 
random-tiebreaking axiom 5).

Remark 4.
Chris Benham suggests the proof might be less confusing (fewer worries about ties etc.)
if we modify the initial example to replace the three voters with three identically voting 
equal-sized large factions and then adding one fickle bullet-voter.
33: A>B>C
33: C>A>B
33: B>C>A
 1: ? (A or B or C)
In this modified version of "Election 1", we could assume some perturbed symmetry axiom
that the lone truncator must determine the winner.  This should lead to a slightly different
theorem statement with a somewhat simpler proof.

Remark 5.
Range voting obeys all 6 axioms if all range votes are
"normalized" so voters (obeying the recommendations for voting on the
http://rangevoting.org front page) always give the best candidate the top
score and the worst the bottom score in a 2-candidate election
[i.e. in practice with voters who are not idiots].
But with possible-idiot voters, range fails axiom #3 (which does not bother me).
CAVEAT: with automatic normalization after the votes are cast,
range voting violates axiom 6.    
Thanks to Markus Schulze for pointing that out.  That's embarrassing if our goal is to
find a set of criteria range voting obeys but rank-ballot methods fail.
Here are some ways to stop being embarrassed:
FIX #1: We can either trust range voters
not to be idiots in 2-candidate elections (to make axiom 3 hold), or we may,
e.g. rephrase axiom 6 as
  6'. adding a new candidate to the election whom all voters unanimously rank ε below 
  their previous bottommost does not change the winner in the limit ε→0+.
FIX #2 (the one we used in the "Theorem" at top): 
we can discard axiom 3 by use of characterizations of simple majority rule
as described at top (e.g. Campbell-Kelly), then we are free to use unnormalized range voting
without having to "trust" voters not to be stupid.  This fix is excellent since discarding
axioms is always a fine thing.  Note that then we do not even need to assume anonymity in
the Theorem, aside from (with Campbell-Kelly) a requirement of non-dictatorship.

Then we have indeed proven a sense in which range is superior to EVERY pure-rank-ballot voting
method, and using two of the most important voting criteria AFB and ICC.

Remaining Open question:
what happens if we permit rank order votes to have EQUALITIES in them?
Are ICC and AFB still incompatible or do they become compatible?
I.e. I do not presently know if this theorem can be extended to permit equalities in 

(I thank Forest W. Simmons for inspiring me to work on this some more.)
Warren D Smith

Simmons' proof

A day or 2 later, Forest W. Simmons came with his own proof of (his own version of) my same theorem. His theorem also gives a nice set of criteria range voting satisfies but rank-order methods cannot. Here it is [repost from EM with a few edits by WDS to improve clarity]:

Here's a slightly simpler approach for a slightly weaker result. 
I shall show that (in the case of pure ordinal ballots) you cannot 
have all three of 
Monotonicity, Clone Independence, Pareto, and the Strong FBC.

To be very careful we explicitly list the assumptions:

1. Strictly ranked ordinal ballots.
2. Neutrality (permuting the candidate names on the ballot rankings 
permutes their winning probabilities in the same way.)
3. Anonymity (Permuting the ballots does not affect the outcome.  [WDS: did not need this.])
4. Determinism (Chance is not employed except where required by 
symmetry, i.e in the case of true ties.)
5. Monotonicity - if a voter interchanges two adjacent candidates in her rank order
(converting A>B to B>A, say) that cannot reduce A's winning chances.
      [WDS's proof did not need to assume this]
6. Majority wins when there are only two candidates.  (Actually, this 
property is a consequence of properties one through five above.  
[WDS: Or of property 8, determinism, and non-dictatorship, by Campbell-Kelly 2003.  Also,
axioms 1-5 need to be supplemented with positve responsiveness, i.e. voting A top
will actually make A win if it was an exact A-involving tie, in May's theorem, BUT
ties cannot occur with an odd number of voters, which is the only parity we shall need, so this
supplementation is not necessary for us.]  But we mention it explicitly for convenience.)

7. ICC.  The probabilities assigned by the method to members of a clone 
set must add up to the probability that the method would give to a 
single alternative replacing the clone set on each ballot.
8. Strong FBC.  To each strategy that allows a faction to achieve a 
certain expected level of utility, there is another strategy that 
allows that faction to rank favorite over all other candidates without 
sacrificing that expected level of utility.

The proof:
Suppose that we have three voters with ranked preferences of

1 A>B>>C
1 B>>C>A
1 C>>A>B

Their nearest expression in the pure ordinal ballots of our method 
would be

1 A>B>C
1 B>C>A
1 C>A>B .

Properties one thru four demand that each alternative be given equal 
probability P(A)=P(B)=P(C)= (1/3) .

The A>B>C voter's expectation is below their utility of their 
compromise B, while the other two voters' compromises have less utility 
than their expected utilities.

So a sure win by B would be an improvement for the first two voters.

The first voter can accomplish this unilaterally by burying favorite:

1 B>C>A
1 B>C>A
1 C>A>B

Properties 6, and 7 (applied to the clone set {C, A}) make B the 
winner with 100 percent probability under our method with this ballot 

Now property 8 says the first voter can do as well without moving A downward from the top.  
With that constraint all she can do is 
switch B and C:

1 A>C>B
1 B>C>A
1 C>A>B

For future reference we will call this ballot set S.

Here the {A,C} clone set has a majority over B, so by property 6, all 
of the probability goes to {A,C}. And since there is no symmetry that 
would require chance, either A or C gets 100 percent of the probability 
by our axiom of determinism.

We know that C is not the one with 100 percent probability because the 
FBC guarantees that our result will be no worse than B.

So our method gives the win to A, given this ballot set.

Now here's the tricky part:

We change this last ballot set S into the following one S' by two 
different means: (1) raising A over C on the middle ballot. OR
(2) swapping A with C on every ballot and then swapping the first and 
last ballot.

1 A>C>B
1 B>A>C
1 C>A>B

Monotonicity ensures that A is still the winner, since all we did was 
raise A relative to C on one ballot (at least from the first point of 

But from the point of view of the second way of getting from S to S', 
neutrality and anonymity require that the win switch from A to C.

This contradiction shows that the stated conditions are incompatible. 

What if rank-equalities are allowed in ballots? A partial result

Then, I am presently unable to settle the question of whether AFB and ICC are incompatible. However, I can prove ICC is incompatible with an inequivalent version of AFB (which I do not preferentially endorse) call it AFB':

AFB' = "Raising favorite to top rank must not decrease expected utility."
AFB' is easier to work with than AFB, but I regard it as of less interest. AFB'⇒AFB but the reverse implication does not hold. Here are the details:
AFB', ICC, neutrality, the assumption that in a perfect 3-way tie you break ties
randomly with all tiers getting nonzero win probabilities,
and finally,  reduction to simple majority vote in the 2-candidate case (which
assumption again can be replaced by simpler ones),
are logically incompatible in any single-winner election method based on rank-order 
ballots with rank-equalities permitted.

Begin with the election
3       A=B>C
3       C=A>B
3       B=C>A
2       A>C>B
2       B>A>C
2       C>B>A
By symmetry this is a perfect 3-way tie.
Now suppose the three A=B>C voters all betray their co-favorite B to get
3       A>B>C
3       C=A>B
3       B=C>A
2       A>C>B
2       B>A>C
2       C>B>A
and then the B>A>C voters (regarded as B>A>>C),
all betray their solo favorite B, to get
3       A>B>C
3       A=C>B
3       B=C>A
2       A>C>B
2       A>B>C
2       C>B>A
and finally the A=C>B voters betray their co-favorite C to get
3       A>B>C *
3       A>C>B *
3       B=C>A
2       A>C>B
2       A>B>C *
2       C>B>A
where the *s indicate dishonest votes.
A wins in this scenario with 100% probability
(by ICC and 2-candidate majority using the clone set {B,C}).
So the net effect of these 3+2+3=8 betrayal decisions, was to cause a
result all 8 of the betrayer-voters prefer.  The betrayals worked.

Now consider these 8 betrayers changing their votes to the betrayal-vote
one by one.  At the start-end of the 8-betrayal chain, ABC tie. At the
finish-end, A wins (a result all betrayer-types prefer).  
So at some point in the chain, there must have 
been a beneficial (to that betrayer) election-result-change.

This proves a single betrayal must work in some election situation.
However...  it remains possible that some non-betraying dishonest vote
also works.  But with the weakened definition AFB' of AFB
that is not an issue.

Some remarks by Forest Simmons on the preceding theorem+proof

Ingenious! That settles it for practical purposes, because voters are not sophisticated enough to take advantage of AFB when AFB' fails. [WDS: I am not as happy as Forest. But we shall let him continue...]

AFB says that you can remain loyal to favorite if you are clever enough. AFB' says that remaining loyal to favorite will never mess things up, even if you are not too clever. And that's what people want.

Roughly speaking the two main reasons that people are interested in replacing Plurality with something else are

  1. the "vote splitting" problem and
  2. the "lesser evil" problem.
Crudely speaking, ICC encapsulates the vote splitting problem and AFB the lesser evil problem and this all shows that you can't cure both problems using a ranked-ballot (with or without equalities permitted) voting method, but you can have your cake and eat it too with range voting.

Finally I note that the faction sizes 3,3,3,2,2,2 could more simply have been 2,2,2,1,1,1 because 2+2+1 is greater than half of 2+2+2+1+1+1.

Are there other property-sets range voting satisfies but no rank-order method can all-satisfy?

Yes. The property-sets mentioned above are particularly appealing because AFB and ICC seem very important properties to make democracy work. But other property sets also work and may have some appeal.

These five properties are incompatible in a single-winner voting system based on 
pure-rank-order ballots:
1. partition-consistency.  (That is, if X wins in district 1 and in district 2, then X must win
in the combined 2-district country.)
2. AFB
3. "responsiveness at top" - raising a candidate from second-top to top in your vote
(by swapping those two positions) in some election situations actually helps him.
4. anonymity 
5. neutrality

Proof sketch.
The hard part was done by 
[John H. Smith: Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate,
Econometrica 41,6 (1973) 1027-1041.
H. Peyton Young: Social choice scoring functions,
SIAM J. Appl. Math. 28,4 (1975) 824-838.]
These authors independently showed that any rank-ballot system obeying axioms 1, 4, and 5 
had to be a "composition of weighted positional systems."
But then that is readily seen to be incompatible with properties 2 and 3
(e.g. by considering a suitable cyclic-tie situation).

These four properties are incompatible in a single-winner voting system based on 
pure-rank-order ballots:
1. three-candidate semi-honesty.  (That is, in a 3-candidate election, it is never
strategically forced to dishonestly vote as though X>Y when your honest view is Y>X.)
2. determinism.
3. no dictator.
4. unanimously top-ranked candidate must win.

Proof sketch.
This is an immediate consequence of the 
Gibbard-Satterthwaite strategyproofness theorem.

These three properties are incompatible in a single-winner voting system based on 
pure-rank-order ballots:
1. no dictator.
2. If every voter prefers A to B then so does the group.  (This implicitly assumes
the voting system outputs not only a winner but also a rank-order of all finishers.
You can get a rank order even from a system without one by ranking the winner first,
then delete that candidate from all ballots and ask who would have won then - rank
him "second" - and so on.)
3. "independence of irrelevant alternatives":
The relative positions of A and B in the group ranking depend on their relative positions 
in the individual rankings, but do not depend on the individual rankings of any 
"irrelevant alternative," i.e. other candidate, C; to word it more precisely,
we shall demand that if C is deleted from all ballots, then whether A finishes
ahead of or behind B, is unaffected.

Proof sketch.
This is an immediate consequence of K.Arrow's impossibility theorem.

Range voting obeys all the properties in all of the above theorems (at least if simple majority in
the 2-candidate case is dealt with appropriately, cf. remark 5 above).  Thus each one demonstrates 
a way in which range voting is superior to all rank-ballot voting methods.

Another theorem: Every single-winner voting system based on rank-order ballots (with equalities either forbidden or permitted – both work) must suffer from at least one of the following paradoxes:

  1. No-Show Paradox: A voter is better off (in the sense the election result improves from her point of view) by not voting than voting honestly.
  2. Condorcet failure: A "beats-all winner" candidate X (who defeats all opponents Y in elections based on the given votes but with all candidates besides X and Y removed) still loses the election.
  3. District partitioning paradox: A candidate wins in every district, but loses the general election.
  4. More-is-less Paradox (monotonicity failure): If the winner had been ranked higher by some voters, another candidate would have won.

Proof: This claim was made in P.C.Fishburn & S.J.Brams: Paradoxes of Preferential Voting, Mathematics Magazine 56, 4 (Sept. 1983) 207-214. Actually, just criteria 1 and 2 alone are incompatible, and that is true whether or not rank-equalities are permitted; a proof, due to Markus Schulze and really dating back to Herve Moulin, is found in my paper #79 here or on this page. Q.E.D.

Range voting, however, avoids all of these paradoxes (at least, as they are worded here).

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