How often do the Range Voting and Approval Voting
winners differ?

We consider a maximally simple model in which each voter regards each of the C candidates as
having a random number as his election utility.
There are V voters, and a percentage F of them
are "strategic" with the rest honest.
On this page, by
"strategic range voter" we mean "honest approval voter using
threshholding based on the mean candidate utility." Thus with F=100
Range and Approval act identically.
The results of running the program are:

The line with the "*" is the closest approximation to Iowa 2008 situation.
As you can see, the Approval Voting and Range Voting winners differed in 31% of
those simulations.

How often do the Range Voting and Approval Voting
winners differ from the Plurality winner?

We again consider the
maximally simple model in which each voter regards each of the C candidates as
having a random number as his election utility.
There are V voters, and a percentage F of them
are "strategic" with the rest honest. On this page, by
"strategic range voter" we mean "honest approval voter using
threshholding based on the mean candidate utility" and by
"strategic plurality voter" we mean "always votes for one of the first two candidates,
whichever has greater utility."
The results of running the program are:

The lines with the "*" are the closest approximations to Iowa 2008 caucus situation.

At least in this model it is clear that the chances of a visibly different result
in Iowa 2008 from adopting range instead of plurality, are large, and if both the
Dem and Repub primaries are considered, the probability that a winner will differ
in at least one of the two party's cases, is very large.